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SEC POLICY CHANGE RE SETTLEMENTS
WITH ADMISSIONS OF WRONGDOING
Lewis D. Lowenfels* and Michael J. Sullivan**
I. INTRODUCTIONON June 18, 2013, the Chair of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission ("SEC") announced that the agency was revising its
longstanding policy of permitting defendants in SEC enforce-
ment cases to settle proceedings without admitting or denying the gov-
ernment's allegations.' Going forward, the Chair stated, in certain
circumstances the SEC will be demanding admissions of wrongdoing
from defendants in order to settle cases.
Perhaps the most powerful influence leading to the SEC's revision of
its longstanding policy of permitting defendants in SEC enforcement
cases to settle proceedings without admitting or denying the govern-
ment's allegations has been two decisions by U.S. District Judge Jed S.
Rakoff: SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp.2 and SEC. v. Citigroup
Global Markets Inc.3 The latter decision was later vacated by the Second
Circuit, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc. ;4 see also SEC v. Citigroup
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1. Dave Michaels, SEC Says It Will Seek Admissions of Wrongdoing More, BLOOM-
BERG (June 19, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-18/sec-to-seek-guilt-admis
sions-in-more-cases-chairman-white-says.html.
2. 771 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2011).
3. 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011).
4. 2011 WL 6937373 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2011); 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 2012); 752
F.3d 285 (2d Cir. June 4, 2014).
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Global Markets Inc.5 As we shall see below, however, the SEC appears to
have adopted in practice certain tenets of Judge Rakoff's position that
admissions of wrongdoing should be obtained from defendants to justify
settling certain serious enforcement cases.
II. THE SEC'S POSITION
Forty days after Judge Rakoff's decision on November 28, 2011, in SEC
v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc.,6 rejecting a proposed SEC settlement
and sharply criticizing the SEC's longstanding policy of settling cases on
the basis of neither requiring an admission nor permitting a denial by
defendants, the SEC announced an important change in its settlement
policy. On January 7, 2012, the SEC's Enforcement Director announced
that the agency was dropping its "neither admit nor deny" settlement lan-
guage in cases where there were parallel criminal convictions or admis-
sions by defendants of criminal violations. The comparatively short public
statement emphasized the following:
[T]he new policy does not require admissions or adjudications of fact
beyond those already made in criminal cases, but eliminates lan-
guage that may be construed as inconsistent with admissions or find-
ings that have already been made in the criminal cases.
... The change applies to cases involving parallel (i) criminal convic-
tions or (ii) NPAs [non-prosecution agreements] or DPAs [deferred
prosecution agreements] that include admissions or acknowledg-
ments of criminal conduct. Under the new approach, for those set-
tlements we will:
" Delete the "neither admit nor deny" language from the settle-
ment documents.
* Recite the fact and nature of the criminal conviction or crimi-
nal NPA/DPA in the settlement documents.
* Give the staff discretion to incorporate into the settlement doc-
uments any relevant facts admitted during the plea allocution
or set out in a jury verdict form or in the criminal NPA/DPA.
* Retain the current prohibition on denying the allegations of
the Complaint/OIP [Order Instituting Administrative Proceed-
ings] or making statements suggesting the Commission's allega-
tions are without factual basis.
The revision applies in the minority of our cases where there is a
parallel criminal conviction (by plea or verdict) or criminal NPA/
DPA involving factual or legal claims that overlap to some degree
with the factual or legal claims set out in the Commission's complaint
or OIP.
5. 34 F. Supp. 3d 379 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014).
6. 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011).
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This policy change does not affect our traditional "neither admit nor
deny" approach in settlements that do not involve criminal convic-
tions or admissions of criminal law violations. 7
There are two points that should be noted with respect to this SEC
policy change.
First, this change is a limited concession to Judge Rakoff's position.
While still retaining its "neither admit nor deny" language for the major-
ity of its settlements, the SEC has nonetheless modified its settlement
language with respect to an important minority of its enforcement cases.
Moreover, this change takes on particular significance in light of two
trends: first, the increasing numbers of parallel proceedings and, second,
that this increasing number of parallel proceedings commonly represents
the most important SEC enforcement initiatives.
Second, this SEC policy change is eminently sensible on the merits and
reflects sound public policy. It is hard to defend the presence of a
"neither admit nor deny" provision in an SEC enforcement settlement
where defendants have already admitted to, or have been criminally con-
victed of, conduct that formed the basis of a parallel criminal conviction.
On June 18, 2013, the SEC went beyond its initial January 7, 2012
change in settlement policies where parallel criminal convictions were in-
volved. On June 18, 2013, the agency announced that going forward it
would be demanding admissions of wrongdoing to settle any enforcement
proceedings, whether or not criminal convictions or admissions were in-
volved, where the agency in its sole discretion deemed such admissions to
be appropriate. 8 The Chair of the SEC attempted to clarify this revised
approach to the Commission's longstanding policy in a speech before the
Council of Institutional Investors on September 26, 2013.
Another principle of an effective enforcement program is the recog-
nition that there are some cases where monetary penalties and com-
pliance enhancements are not enough. An added measure of public
accountability is necessary, and in those cases we should demand
it. ..
Since laying out this new approach, the most frequent question we
get is about the types of cases where admissions might be
appropriate.
Candidates potentially requiring admissions include:
" Cases where a large number of investors have been harmed or
the conduct was otherwise egregious.
* Cases where the conduct posed a significant risk to the market
or investors.
* Cases where admissions would aid investors deciding whether
to deal with a particular party in the future.
7. Robert Khuzami, Public Statement by SEC Staff- Recent Policy Change, SEC (Jan.
7, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spchOl0712rsk.htm.
8. Michaels, supra note 1.
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* Cases where reciting unambiguous facts would send an impor-
tant message to the market about a particular case.
To reiterate, no-admit-no-deny settlements are a very important tool
in our enforcement arsenal that we will continue to use when we
believe it is in public interest to do so. In other cases, we will be
requiring admissions. These decisions are for us to make within our
discretion, not decisions for a court to make. 9
There are a number of points that should be noted with respect to this
articulation of the new SEC policy.
First, the Chair's list of the types of cases where admissions might be
appropriate is sweeping in its coverage. The articulated criteria can be
applied to almost any enforcement proceeding initiated by the Commis-
sion. Moreover, the combination of this sweeping coverage with the
SEC's position that it has complete discretion, unchecked by the courts,
to determine whether or not to demand admissions to settle specific
cases, is a very powerful tool to place in the arsenal of a U.S. government
agency.
Second, the SEC itself has not been consistent in its definition of the
criteria to be applied to determine the types of cases where admissions
might be appropriate. In another speech delivered five months after her
September 26, 2013 Address, Ms. White added two additional criteria to
her list quoted above: first, she emphasized the importance of the SEC's
belief that the defendants' misconduct had been intentional, and second,
she indicated that the Commission may pursue admissions of wrongdoing
"[w]hen a party obstructs an investigation." Similarly, the SEC Enforce-
ment Division's co-directors had issued a memorandum to enforcement
staff months before Chair White's speeches that also added these addi-
tional criteria of intent and obstruction with respect to crafting SEC
settlements.' 0
Third, the Chair's position, as she has readily admitted, was shaped by
her successful, personal experience in the criminal arena. To many securi-
ties lawyers, however, whose views have been shaped by careers spent
largely in the civil enforcement and transactional world of the SEC, the
Chair's position may be another example of the disquieting criminaliza-
tion of the SEC's enforcement process-clearly the questionable re-
sponse of a proud agency to its humiliating failure to prevent, or at the
least to uncover, the Bernard Madoff scandal.
Fourth, the SEC and Judge Rakoff share a common goal-more admis-
sions by defendants regarding misconduct in determining the terms of
SEC settlements. Both the SEC and Judge Rakoff share an emphasis
upon the important policy of demanding public accountability for miscon-
duct which undergirds and justifies this demand for admissions by de-
9. Mary Jo White, Deploying the Full Enforcement Arsenal, SEC (Sept. 26, 2013)
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539841202.
10. Yin Wilczek, White Announces Revision of SEC 'No Admit' Policy, 45 BNA Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. at 1150 (June 24, 2013).
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fendants. There are, however, crucial differences between Judge Rakoff's
position and the position of the SEC that are cogently summarized in the
final paragraph of the quoted excerpt from Ms. White's Address. The
SEC is adamant that whether or not to demand admissions in the
agency's settlements of enforcement actions is a decision for the agency,
within its discretion, and not a decision for the courts. This position,
moreover, has the powerful support of the Second Circuit.a" A second
crucial difference between Judge Rakoff and the SEC is the agency's ex-
pressed intention, subsequently implemented in most of its cases, to con-
tinue to use its "neither admit nor deny" enforcement tool in the great
majority of SEC settlements. The "win-win" attractions of eliminating lit-
igation costs, returning money to victims more quickly, and preserving
limited resources to deploy to other investigations, have evidently proved
too advantageous for the SEC to abandon in most cases.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE SEC'S POSITION
At the date of this writing there have been sixteen settlements in SEC
enforcement proceedings where the Commission has demanded admis-
sions of wrongdoing from defendants in order to settle a particular pro-
ceeding. We will analyze a number of these settlements and in our
analysis we will focus upon problems, questions, and issues which are
common to many, if not all, of these settlements.
On June 28, 2012, the SEC filed actions in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York against New York-based hedge fund
adviser Philip A. Falcone and his advisory firm, Harbinger Capital Part-
ners LLC, charging conduct that included misappropriation of client as-
sets, market manipulations, and betraying clients. "The SEC also charged
Peter A. Jenson, Harbinger's former chief operating officer, for aiding
and abetting the misappropriation scheme."'12
In particular, the SEC alleges that:
1. Falcone fraudulently obtained $113.2 million from a hedge fund
that he advised and misappropriated the proceeds to pay his per-
sonal taxes;
2. Falcone and two Harbinger investment managers, through which
Falcone operated manipulated the price and availability of a series of
distressed high-yield bonds by engaging in an illegal "short squeeze;"
3. Falcone and Harbinger secretly offered and granted favorable re-
demption and liquidity rights to certain strategically important inves-
tors in exchange for those investors' consent to restrict redemption
rights of other fund investors, and concealed the arrangement from
the fund's directors and investors;... "13
11. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. June 4, 2014).




The SEC alleged that these actions violated the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws and sought permanent injunctive relief against
each defendant to enjoin them from future violations of the federal secur-
ities laws, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, financial penalties, and an or-
der barring Falcone from serving as an officer or director of a public
company.
In May, 2013, almost a year after the filing of the SEC complaints, Fal-
cone's publicly traded holding company disclosed in an SEC filing that
Falcone and certain of his affiliated entities had reached an agreement in
principle with the SEC staff to settle with the Commission. The terms of
the prospective settlement provided that defendants would pay $18 mil-
lion in disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and civil penalties. In addi-
tion, while Falcone would continue to serve as CEO and board chairman
of his publicly traded holding company, he would be barred for two years
from associating with a broker-dealer, investment adviser, and other reg-
ulated entities. The prospective settlement provided that the defendants
would neither admit nor deny the SEC's allegations.
As we have discussed above, on June 18, 2013, the Chair of the SEC
announced that the agency was revising its longstanding policy of permit-
ting defendants in SEC enforcement cases to settle proceedings without
admitting or denying the government's allegations. While the Chair
stated that the Commission would continue its "neither admit nor deny"
policy in settling certain cases, in other cases, where the public interest
demanded public accountability, the SEC would seek admissions from
defendants in order to settle.
On July 18, 2013, a month after its policy change announcement, the
Commission voted to reject the agreement in principle that its staff had
reached with Falcone and certain affiliated entities earlier in the year.
While it is not completely clear what role the policy shift played in the
Commission's rejection of the settlement, the subsequent events are
clear. On August 19, 2013, the SEC announced that a final settlement
agreement had been reached with Falcone and Harbinger on the same
terms as the earlier agreement in principle except for two important dif-
ferences. First, Falcone's bar was increased from two years to five years,
and, second, in the final settlement papers filed with the court, the set-
tling defendants had admitted to "multiple acts of misconduct that
harmed investors and interfered with the normal functioning of the secur-
ities markets.' 1 4 After the court approved the settlement on September
26, 2013, the SEC enumerated the defendant's admissions as follows:
Among the set of facts that Falcone and Harbinger admitted to in set-
tlement papers filed with the court:
* Falcone improperly borrowed $113.2 million from the Harbinger
Capital Partners Special Situations Fund (SSF) at an interest rate
less than SSF was paying to borrow money, to pay his personal tax
14. SEC Press Release 2013-159 (Aug. 19, 2013).
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obligation, at a time when Falcone had barred other SSF investors
from making redemptions, and did not disclose the loan to investors
for approximately five months.
" Falcone and Harbinger granted favorable redemption and liquidity
terms to certain large investors in HCP Fund I, and did not disclose
certain of these arrangements to the fund's board of directors and
the other fund investors.
* During the summer of 2006, Falcone heard rumors that a Financial
Services Firm was shorting the bonds of [a] Canadian manufacturer,
and encouraging its customers to do the same.
* In September and October 2006, Falcone retaliated against the Fi-
nancial Services Firm for shorting the bonds by causing the Harbin-
ger funds to purchase all of the remaining outstanding bonds in the
open market.
* Falcone and the other Defendants then demanded that the Finan-
cial Services Firm settle its outstanding transactions in the bonds
and deliver the bonds that it owed. Defendants did not disclose at
the time that it would be virtually impossible for the Financial Ser-
vices Firm to acquire any bonds to deliver, as nearly the entire sup-
ply was locked up in the Harbinger funds' custodial account and the
Harbinger funds were not offering them for sale.
" Due to Falcone's and the other Defendants' improper interference
with the normal interplay of supply and demand in the bonds, the
bonds more than doubled in price during this period. 15
The SEC settlement with Peter A. Jenson, Harbinger's former chief
operating officer and a chartered accountant, who was charged with aid-
ing and abetting the loan transaction, did not occur until October 1, 2014.
Jenson agreed to pay $200,000 to the SEC as a civil penalty, to be en-
joined from participating in the securities industry for at least two years,
and to be denied the privilege of appearing or practicing before the Com-
mission as an accountant for a similar period. As part of his settlement,
Jenson not only admitted to certain acts of misconduct as had Falcone
and Harbinger, but, importantly, also acknowledged that his conduct vio-
lated the federal securities laws.
[Peter A. Jenson ("Jenson")] admits the facts set forth [below and]
acknowledges that his conduct violated the federal securities laws...
1. On August 13, 2013, Philip A. Falcone ("Falcone") and Harbinger
[Capital Partners LLC ("Harbinger")] entered into a Final Consent
Judgment to resolve the claims asserted against them in the civil ac-
tion 12-CV-5028 (PAC) (the "Action") pending in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. As part of the
Consent Judgment, Falcone and Harbinger admitted, among other
things, that on October 14, 2009, without seeking or obtaining inves-
tor consent, in connection with the purchase, offer or sale of a secur-
15. SEC Litigation Release No. 22831 (Oct. 2, 2013).
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ity, Falcone improperly borrowed $113.2 million from the Harbinger
Capital Partners Special Situations Fund, L.P. ("SSF") to pay his
state and federal taxes.
2. Jenson, Harbinger's Chief Operating Officer, among other things,
executed the loan agreement and other transaction documents on
behalf of the SSF in connection with the loan.
3. The loan agreement provided that "[t]he Lender's counsel shall
have provided advice to the Lender to the effect that the making of
the Loan... would not be inconsistent with the Borrower's fiduciary
obligation to the Lender." Jenson, however, did not ensure that SSF
as lender had separate counsel, and did not ensure that the loan was
consistent with the Borrower's fiduciary obligation to the Lender.
4. Jenson also failed to ensure that Falcone paid an "above market"
interest rate on the loan, failed to timely disclose the loan to inves-
tors, and failed to take actions to cause the SSF to accelerate Fal-
cone's payment on the loan once investors in the SSF were permitted
to begin redeeming their investments.
5. Jenson, with knowledge of Falcone's and Harbinger's violations in
connection with the loan, substantially assisted these violations. 16
The Falcone, Harbinger, and Jenson settlements are not only significant
because they represent, in the case of Falcone and Harbinger, the first
settlements under the SEC's new admissions policy, but for other reasons
as well.
First, as set out above in the settlement between Falcone, Harbinger,
and the SEC finalized on October 2, 2013, the defendants' admissions of
facts were described by the SEC as follows: "Among the set of facts that
Falcone and Harbinger admitted to in settlement papers filed with the
court [were the following]: ."..17 By contrast, in the settlement between
Jenson and the SEC in the same case one year later, defendant Jenson's
admissions of facts were coupled with his acknowledgement that his con-
duct had violated the federal securities laws as follows: "Peter A. Jenson
("Jenson") admits to the facts set forth below and acknowledges that his
conduct violated the federal securities laws:..." 18 Therefore, in summary,
there are three different gradations of wording with respect to admissions
or the lack of admissions in the SEC enforcement settlements involving
Falcone and his associated parties. In the initial agreement in principle
between Falcone, Harbinger, and the SEC staff, the defendants did not
admit or deny the government's allegations. After the Commission's re-
jection of the initial agreement in principle, however, the final settlement
agreement between Falcone, Harbinger, and the Commission contained
crucial admissions of facts by the settling defendants. The final settlement
16. SEC Release No. 3589 (Oct. 3, 2014) (emphasis added).
17. SEC Litigation Release No. 22831 (Oct. 2, 2013) (emphasis added).
18. SEC Release No. 3589, supra note 16 (emphasis added).
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agreement between Jenson and the SEC contained admissions of facts
and an acknowledgement of violations of the federal securities laws.
Clearly, for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel in parallel
private damage actions, the different practical impacts that may result
from these different gradations of wordings in SEC settlement agree-
ments are potentially enormous.
Second, while the increasingly severe gradations from (1) neither admit
nor deny, to (2) admissions of facts, to (3) admissions of facts accompa-
nied by acknowledgements of violations of law, are clear, their applica-
tion to specific defendants is puzzling. Jenson is only an aider and abettor
while Falcone is the prime mover and prime wrongdoer; yet Jenson is
required to acknowledge violations of law as well as admit facts while
Falcone is permitted by the SEC to settle without any acknowledgement
of violations of law.
Third, with respect to satisfying the criteria for requiring admissions of
wrongdoing set out in the SEC Chair's public address on September 26,
2013, quoted above, the wrongdoings attributed to the primary wrongdo-
ers in the Falcone case would appear to fully satisfy each and every one of
Chair White's four enumerated sets of criteria. Falcone and Harbinger
egregiously harmed a large number of investors by using their assets to
pay Falcone's taxes, by secretly favoring certain customers to the detri-
ment and at the expense of other customers, and by engaging in bond
transactions in the public securities markets at arbitrary and inflated
prices which Falcone and Harbinger had manipulated. Also, this conduct,
particularly the manipulation of bond prices, posed a significant risk to
the public securities markets. In addition, the admissions described above
would warn investors against dealing with Falcone and Harbinger in the
future and thereby send an important message to the markets. Unfortu-
nately, however, these criteria, which are all-encompassing in their
breadth, would apply to almost any enforcement proceeding initiated by
the SEC, and, therefore, in reality, are not particularly useful in terms of
practical guidance with respect to future admissions.
As of this writing the SEC has not clarified in any meaningful way the
criteria that it will apply in determining the types of cases where admis-
sions will be demanded from defendants to settle enforcement actions.
Indeed, an analysis of the following SEC settlements which contain ad-
missions and which have been concluded after the Commission's policy
change in June, 2013, appears to offer little guidance with respect to when
admissions will be required from defendants.
On September 19, 2013, the SEC charged JPMorgan Chase & Co "with
misstating financial results and lacking effective internal controls to de-
tect and prevent its traders from fraudulently overvaluing investments to
conceal hundreds of millions of dollars in trading losses."' 9 JPMorgan
agreed to settle the SEC's charges by paying a $200 million penalty, ad-
19. SEC Press Release No. 2013-187 (Sept. 19, 2013).
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mitting the facts underlying the charges and publicly acknowledging that
it had violated the federal securities laws. The facts admitted by JPMor-
gan included the following:
" The trading losses occurred against a backdrop of woefully deficient
accounting controls in the [firm's chief investment office,] CIO, in-
cluding spreadsheet miscalculations that caused large valuation er-
rors and the use of subjective valuation techniques that made it
easier for the traders to mismark the CIO portfolio.
" JPMorgan senior management personally rewrote the CIO's valua-
tion control policies before the firm filed with the SEC its first quar-
ter report for 2012 in order to address the many deficiencies in
existing policies.
* By late April 2012, JPMorgan senior management knew that the
firm's Investment Banking unit used far more conservative prices
when valuing the same kind of derivatives held in the CIO portfo-
lio, and that applying the Investment Bank valuations would have
led to approximately $750 million in additional losses for the CIO in
the first quarter of 2012.
" External counterparties who traded with CIO had valued certain
positions in the CIO book at $500 million less than the CIO traders
did, precipitating large collateral calls against JPMorgan.
" As a result of the findings of certain internal reviews of the CIO,
some executives expressed reservations about signing sub-certifica-
tions supporting the CEO and CFO certifications required under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
* Senior management failed to adequately update the audit commit-
tee on these and other important facts concerning the CIO before
the firm filed its first quarter report for 2012.
" Deprived of access to these facts, the audit committee was hindered
in its ability to discharge its obligations to oversee management on
behalf of shareholders and to ensure the accuracy of the firm's fi-
nancial statements. 20
The SEC administrative order required JPMorgan Chase to cease and
desist from causing any violations and any future violations of Sections
13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rules 13a-11, 13a-13 and 13a-15.
This settlement appears to be the first case under the SEC's new admis-
sions policy where the defendant not only admitted certain facts, but also
acknowledged violations of the federal securities laws-acknowledge-
ments that may well have substantial collateral effects. These SEC de-
mands, however, would seem to be justified in this high profile "London
Whale" case against a mega financial institution where the dollars in-
volved were substantial and the violations extremely serious. Moreover,
JPMorgan's CEO initially dismissed the allegations as "a tempest in a
20. Id. at 2.
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teapot" 21-a statement guaranteed to heighten the regulatory response.
On December 18, 2013, the SEC settled administrative proceedings
containing fraud charges against three brokerage subsidiaries and two
former employees of ConvergEx Group LLC, a global trading services
provider that caused many institutional clients to pay substantially higher
amounts than disclosed for the execution of trading orders.22 Under the
terms of these settlements each of the defendants admitted the facts un-
derlying the charges and publicly acknowledged that they had violated
the federal securities laws. Parallel criminal charges against ConvergEx
Group LLC, a brokerage subsidiary, and the two former employees were
concurrently resolved, and the defendants agreed to pay an aggregate of
fines, penalties, disgorgement, and interest totaling more than $150 mil-
lion to resolve all administrative and criminal charges.
The SEC found that the defendants' acts violated Section 10(b) and
15(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and described these acts as
follows:
Customers with large orders typically rely on their brokers to exe-
cute orders on their behalf at the most favorable terms reasonably
available. Monitoring the execution quality and costs of these orders
can be difficult even for the most sophisticated investors given the
complex nature of the markets where brokers must choose from a
variety of order types, routing strategies, and trading venues.
According to the SEC's order instituting settled administrative pro-
ceedings, the ConvergEx brokerage firms represented to customers
that they charge explicit commissions to execute equity trading or-
ders. However, they routinely routed orders, including orders for
U.S. equities, to an offshore affiliate in Bermuda that executed them
on a riskless basis and opportunistically boosted their profits by ad-
ding a mark-up or mark-down on the price of a security. The off-
shore affiliate often consulted with the client-facing brokers to assess
the risk of customer detection before taking the extra money on top
of the disclosed commissions. The mark-ups and mark-downs caused
many customers to unknowingly pay more than double what they
understood they were paying to have their orders executed.
According to the SEC's order, the ConvergEx brokerages involved
in the scheme were G-Trade Services LLC, ConvergEx Global Mar-
kets Limited, and ConvergEx Execution Solutions LLC. Their cus-
21. Javier E. David, JPMorgan pays hefty cost for 'Whale', settles for 920 mln, CNBC
(Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/2013/09119/new-jpmorgan-whale-fine-brings-total-to-
920-million.html.
22. In re G-Trade Services LLC, SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-15654 (Dec. 18, 2013);
In re Daspin, SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-15652 (Dec. 18, 2013); In re Lekargeren, SEC
Admin. Proc. File No. 3-15653 (Dec. 18, 2013).
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tomers included funds managed on behalf of charities, religious
organizations, retirement plans, universities, and governments. The
ConvergEx brokerages believed they would lose business if custom-
ers became aware of their mark-ups and mark-downs, so they en-
gaged in specific acts to hide the scheme. Typically, they only took
mark-ups and mark-downs on top of the disclosed commissions in
situations where they believed that the risk of detection was low.
They also made false and misleading statements to customers who
inquired about their overall compensation, even providing certain
customers with falsified trading data to cover up the fact that the
offshore affiliate had taken mark-ups or mark-downs on their orders.
The practice of executing orders through the offshore affiliate was
not adequately disclosed to customers and was inconsistent with
ConvergEx's advertised conflict-free agency model. Using this prac-
tice, the ConvergEx brokers failed to seek best execution for their
customers' orders.23
It should be noted that in this ConvergEx case, the SEC's demands for
admissions were an implementation of its policy decision on January 7,
2012 to drop its "neither admit nor deny" settlement language in cases
where there were parallel criminal convictions or admissions by defend-
ants of criminal violations. It should also be noted that the SEC's de-
mands for admissions in this case would appear to be justified by the
widespread global activities of the corporate defendant, the large number
of customers affected, the magnitude of the monies involved, and by the
serious nature of the violations.
On January 29, 2014, discount broker Scottrade, Inc. admitted SEC
findings that for a period of six years it had failed to provide the SEC
with complete and accurate information regarding trades completed by
the firm and its customers, commonly called "blue sheet" data. The firm
admitted SEC findings that it violated certain recordkeeping provisions
of the federal securities laws, agreed to pay a $2.5 million penalty, and
undertook to implement remedial measures. The SEC had requested the
data while investigating unauthorized uses of accounts and found that
certain "blue sheet" data was missing.24 The SEC's Administrative Order
summarized the underlying policies, facts and violations as follows:
Scottrade admits the findings set forth in Section III below....
III
On the basis of this Order and Respondent's Offer, the Commission
finds that:
Summary
It is a fundamental obligation of broker-dealers to provide complete
and accurate blue sheet data when requested by representatives of
23. SEC Press Release No. 2013-266 (Dec. 18, 2013).
24. In re Scottrade, Inc., SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-15702, 2 (Jan. 29, 2014).
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the Commission to do so. Blue sheet data is critical to many aspects
of the Commission's operations and its ability to discharge its en-
forcement and regulatory mandates. The failure of a broker-dealer
to provide complete and accurate blue sheet information in response
to a Commission request can impact the Commission's ability to dis-
charge its statutory obligations, undermine the integrity of its investi-
gations and examinations, and ultimately interfere with the
Commission's ability to protect investors.
This action results from Scottrade's violation of the recordkeeping
requirements of Section 17(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 17a-
4(j), 17a-25 and 17a-4(f)(3)(v) thereunder. From March 2006 through
April 2012 (the "relevant period"), Scottrade failed to provide re-
quired accurate and complete blue sheet submissions to the Commis-
sion, and also failed to have an audit system that provided
accountability regarding the inputting of records required to be
maintained and preserved.
Section 17 of the Exchange Act imposes on broker-dealers record-
keeping requirements that are essential to the Commission's ability
to enforce the federal securities laws and to protect investors. To en-
sure the continued effectiveness of the Commission's enforcement
and regulatory programs, broker-dealers must comply with, among
other things: Rule 17a-25, requiring that broker-dealers submit elec-
tronically securities transaction information upon request by the
Commission's staff; Rule 17a-4(j), requiring broker-dealers to fur-
nish promptly true, complete, and current copies of those records
upon request by the Commission's staff; and Rule 17a-4(f)(3)(v), re-
quiring broker-dealers to have an audit system that provides for ac-
countability regarding the inputting of records required to be
maintained and preserved. Scottrade failed to comply with these re-
quirements . ... 25
The precise wording of this settlement order is a bit different from the
wording in the Jenson, JPMorgan, and ConvergEx settlement orders.
Scottrade admits "SEC findings" of facts and violations of law rather than
admitting facts and acknowledging violations of law directly. While it is
difficult to discern or anticipate any practical impact from this slight dif-
ference in wording, the difference does exist. More importantly, however,
the SEC's policy of demanding admissions seems less justified in this case
than in JPMorgan or ConvergEx. The dollar amounts involved are com-
paratively small. There are no criminal violations. The public impact is
comparatively less consequential. And the violations of law regarding re-
cordkeeping and satisfying SEC requests for "blue sheet" data are con-
siderably less serious.
On February 21, 2014, Zurich based Credit Suisse Group AG agreed to
pay $196 million, to admit certain facts, and to acknowledge certain viola-
tions of the federal securities laws to resolve an SEC administrative pro-
25. Id. at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
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ceeding against it. The core of the admitted facts and acknowledged
violations included charges that Credit Suisse had provided cross-border
brokerage and investment advisory services to U.S. clients without first
registering with the SEC.26 The admitted facts and acknowledged viola-
tions were summarized by the SEC as follows:
According to the SEC's order instituting settled administrative pro-
ceedings, Credit Suisse provided cross-border securities services to
thousands of U.S. clients and collected fees totaling approximately
$82 million without adhering to the registration provisions of the fed-
eral securities laws. Credit Suisse relationship managers traveled to
the U.S. to solicit clients, provide investment advice, and induce se-
curities transactions. These relationship managers were not regis-
tered to provide brokerage or advisory services, nor were they
affiliated with a registered entity. The relationship managers also
communicated with clients in the U.S. through overseas e-mails and
phone calls.
According to the SEC's order, Credit Suisse began conducting cross-
border advisory and brokerage services for U.S. clients as early as
2002, amassing as many as 8,500 U.S. client accounts that contained
an average total of $5.6 billion in securities assets. The relationship
managers made approximately 107 trips to the U.S. during a seven-
year period and provided broker-dealer and advisory services to
hundreds of clients they visited. Credit Suisse was aware of the regis-
tration requirements of the federal securities laws and undertook ini-
tiatives designed to prevent such violations. These initiatives largely
failed, however, because they were not effectively implemented or
monitored.
According to the SEC's order, it was not until after a much-publi-
cized civil and criminal investigation into similar conduct by Swiss-
based UBS that Credit Suisse began to take steps in October 2008 to
exit the business of providing cross-border advisory and brokerage
services to U.S. clients. Although the number of U.S. client accounts
decreased beginning in 2009 and the majority were closed or trans-
ferred by 2010, it took Credit Suisse until mid-2013 to completely
exit the cross-border business as the firm continued to collect bro-
ker-dealer and investment adviser fees on some accounts.
The SEC's order finds that Credit Suisse willfully violated Section
15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 203(a) of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. Credit Suisse admitted the
facts in the SEC's order, acknowledged that its conduct violated the
federal securities laws, accepted a censure and a cease-and-desist or-
26. In re Credit Suisse Group AG, SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-15763 (Feb. 21, 2014).
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der, and agreed to retain an independent consultant. Credit Suisse
agreed to pay $82,170,990 in disgorgement, $64,340,024 in prejudg-
ment interest, and a $50 million penalty.2 7
As with respect to the JPMorgan and ConvergEx settlements discussed
above, the SEC demands for admissions by Credit Suisse seem justified.
Credit Suisse's violations were serious, global in scope, affected hundreds
of U.S. investors, and involved substantial sums of money. Also, the
wrongdoing was known to the defendant bank for years, and the bank
took years to comply fully with U.S. securities laws. Finally, and perhaps
most important, at the time of the SEC investigation, Credit Suisse was
also under investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice for allegedly
assisting U.S. citizens for decades in concealing offshore assets and in-
come from the Internal Revenue Service. Indeed, on May 19, 2014, three
months after its SEC settlement, Credit Suisse pled guilty to conspiracy to
aid and assist U.S. taxpayers in filing false income tax returns and other
documents with the Internal Revenue Service. "[This] guilty plea ...
[was] the result of a years-long investigation by U.S. law enforcement
authorities that has also produced indictments of eight Credit Suisse ex-
ecutives .... -28
For another settled SEC administrative proceeding against a Swiss
bank for providing brokerage and advisory services to U.S. customers
before registering with the SEC as a broker-dealer or investment adviser
see In re HSBC Private Bank (Suisse), SA.29 To settle this proceeding,
HSBC Private Bank admitted the alleged facts, acknowledged that its
conduct violated the federal securities laws, accepted a cease and desist
order as well as a censure, and agreed to pay a total of $12.5 million
consisting of $5.7 million in disgorgement, $4.2 million in prejudgment
interest, and a $2.6 million civil penalty. The SEC had alleged that the
bank had realized approximately $5.72 million through its U.S. cross-bor-
der business activities between 2003 and 2011 in violation of Section 15(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 203(a) of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940.
While the SEC's charges against HSBC paralleled the SEC's charges
against Credit Suisse and while there were also reported tax-evasion
schemes involving HSBC that had attracted the attention of the criminal
authorities, HSBC's $12.5 million payout was only a fraction of Credit
Suisse's $196 million payout. These different payouts would seem to be
explained by the different amounts of fees collected by the banks while
not adhering to the registration requirements of the federal securities
laws-$5.7 million by HSBC and $82 million by Credit Suisse-and the
different interest payments thereby generated. The SEC's admissions de-
mands under its revised policy, however, were identical in both cases.
27. SEC Press Release No. 2014-39 (Feb. 21, 2014).
28. DOJ Press Release No. 14-531 (May 19, 2014).
29. SEC Admin. Proc. File No. 3-16288 (Nov. 25, 2014).
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At the time of this writing, additional proceedings reflecting the SEC's
new policy of requiring admissions of wrongdoing from defendants in or-
der to settle certain charges are listed below. Because of the space limita-
tions upon this article, the authors include only a listing of these
additional settlements. A careful analysis of these settlements by the au-
thors, however, has unearthed little additional guidance regarding SEC
demands for admissions of wrongdoing in the future. The essential prob-
lem remains: a lack of standards or guidelines to both restrain the govern-
ment and to offer a degree of predictability and protection for potential
respondents.
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